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1 Introduction
“Consumption insurance studies households’ ability to smooth consumption over
states of nature; the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) studies their ability to
smooth consumption over time. Households may be able to do each and not the
othe”. This quote can be found in Cochrane (1991) a seminal paper which tests the
full consumption insurance hypothesis using household level data. However, the lit-
erature has seldom attempted to distinguish between the predictions of the full risk
sharing model and the ones of the Life-cycle/PIH model. In particular, tests of full
consumption insurance have traditionally been carried under the maintained as-
sumption of absence of liquidity constraints and consequently perfect consumption
smoothing across time.
However, if the Life-cycle/PIH hypothesis is not valid, individual consumption is
likely to respond to changes in individual income, even in the presence of perfect
risk sharing. For example, young consumers, whose income is expected to rise in the
future, will wish to borrow. In the presence of liquidity constraints, they will not
be able to do so, and as a consequence, there consumption will track there income.
This is caused by a failure to smooth consumption across time and therefore will
happen even if full risk sharing is possible; however an econometrician who does
not distinguish between the deterministic life-cycle and the random idiosyncratic
components of income would reject full consumption insurance. This paper aims
at providing a unifying approach to test consumption smoothing both over time
and across states of nature.
In particular, I test the implications of full consumption insurance using band spec-
trum regression methods. This allows me to distinguish between both consumption
smoothing across time and across states of nature. This is because liquidity con-
straints, which prevent consumption smoothing across time, translate into a low
frequency parallel between consumption growth and income growth. On the other
hand lack of risk sharing, which prevents consumption smoothing across states
of nature, translates into a high frequency parallel between consumption and in-
come growth. Band spectrum regression allows to uncover features of the data at
different frequencies and thus to tell apart the two models.
2
Spectral linear regression methods have first been applied to econometrics by En-
gle (1974) who discusses estimation of linear regression models in the context of
measurement error and seasonality and, in particular, suggests as an application
a test of the permanent income hypothesis. This technique allows models to be
evaluated over particular frequencies, such as business cycles, seasonal frequencies
or long horizons. Rather than simply rejecting or accepting the empirical fit of a
model, it becomes possible to identify the frequencies in which the model performs
well and the ones where it is rejected.
Moreover, since band spectrum regression possesses standard small sample proper-
ties, I argue that moving to the frequency domain provides a possible solution to
some difficulties tied to tests of perfect risk sharing. In particular, the band spec-
trum regression approach may be suitable for the estimation of errors-in-variable
models. This is because band spectrum regression allows for models to be esti-
mated over frequencies where measurement error is a less pervasive problem, much
in the same way as moving average filters are used to eliminate high frequency
noise components from measured income in tests of the PIH, for example. Thus,
provided that frequencies at which measurement error is pervasive are excluded,
the full consumption insurance test proposed in this paper will be robust to the
presence of measurement error.
I use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the de-
gree of consumption smoothing among North American households. Many authors
have tested the complete markets model using North American household level
data and findings are ambiguous. Mace (1991), using data from the Consumer
Expenditure Survey (CEX), finds mixed evidence in favor of the full risk sharing
assumption. Cochrane (1991), in the same spirit but using data from the PSID,
measures the correlation between individual consumption growth and some indi-
cators of households resources other than income and also finds mixed evidence.
Recently, Guvenen (2007) using PSID data, rejects full consumption insurance
among stockholders, but fails to reject it among non-stockholders.
Altug and Miller (1990), using PSID data, attempt to address the problem of
nonseparability between food consumption and leisure, which they claim might
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bias other tests, and fail to reject full risk sharing. However, Hayashi et al. (1996),
also using PSID data, reject inter as well as intra-family risk sharing and argue
that the results of Altug and Miller are explained by the lack of power of their
test against the self-insurance hypothesis. The paper by Hayashi et al. (1996)
is particularly interesting because, to my knowledge, it is the only paper where
filtering the data has been suggested as a method to discriminate between risk
sharing and self-insurance. These authors suggest taking long time differences of
consumption and income as a method to construct a test of the complete markets
assumption which has power against the alternative of self-insurance as well as to
adjust for measurement error.
Moreover, the present paper is also related to the literature which tests the Life-
Cycle/PIH using micro panel data sets and in particular attempt to measure the
response of consumption to income shocks of different persistence. Prominent ex-
amples of this stream of work includes, Hall and Mishkin (1982), Bernanke (1984),
Altonji and Siow (1987), and Attanasio and Weber (1995).
The tests of full consumption insurance described above and also the one performed
in this paper fundamentally require estimating a regression equation which includes
as dependent variable the changes in household consumption and on the right-
hand side includes aggregate level variables and idiosyncratic endowment variables.
Under the null hypothesis of full insurance, the latter should not significantly help in
predicting changes in individual consumption. However, the single most important
difficulty faced by studies of full insurance is to find idiosyncratic variables which
are good proxies for individual endowments and are orthogonal to the error term
of the estimated reduced form regression equation. Unfortunately, one variable
which is unlikely to satisfy this requirement is household income because the error
term possibly incorporates changes in preferences which simultaneously affect the
inter-temporal allocation of consumption chosen by households as well as the inter-
temporal allocation of leisure and consequently household income.
To try to solve this problem, I have adopted a two-step instrumental variables
procedure. I first regress the household income on a number of variables which are
likely to be exogenous such as days of work lost because of strikes or unemployment
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and hourly average earnings, for example. In the second step, I use the predicted
growth rate of income as a continuous scale proxy for idiosyncratic endowment
changes and I implement the test of full insurance applying the band spectrum
regression method. Because of the nature of the null hypothesis being tested (under
full insurance the impact of idiosyncratic shocks is zero), the tests statistics should
be asymptotically consistent, despite the regressors being estimated which leads to
a downward bias in the estimation of the regression coefficient standard errors.1
The findings of the paper are not supportive of the full risk sharing, complete
markets hypothesis, but they are broadly consistent with the self-insurance hy-
pothesis. In particular, full consumption insurance is soundly rejected at business
cycle frequencies. Importantly, a rejection of consumption insurance at business
cycle frequencies suggests that the representative agent construct may be an inap-
propriate paradigm for business cycle models. However, consumption is found to
respond more strongly to long lasting income shocks than to rapid, high frequency,
shocks in accordance with the permanent income hypothesis.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I build a frame-
work to test the complete markets assumption and in particular I show that given
the standard inter-temporal consumer choice model, consumption growth can be
represented by a well defined factor structure. Section 3 describes the econometric
methodology employed, in particular the band spectrum regression method. In
section 4 I briefly describe the data used in the paper and I discuss some issues
involving the empirical implementation. Finally, in section 5 I report my results
and section 6 concludes.
2 Testing Full Consumption Insurance
Assuming complete markets and absence of private information, the solution to the
social planner problem is the same as the resource allocation rule that solves the
decentralized competitive equilibrium problem. Therefore, the conditions necessary
to solve the planning problem provide testable implications of full consumption
insurance. The derivation of the testable implications of full consumption insurance
1see Pagan (1984)
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which follows is well known and in particular can be found in Cochrane (1991). It
is included here for completeness.
Consider the planning problem for an endowment economy with N households
max
N∑
j=1
λj
∞∑
t=0
∑
St
(
βj
) t
π (st)u(c
j(st), b
j
t) (2.1)
s.t
∑
j
cj(st) ≤
∑
j
yj(st),
Where j indexes households, t indexes time, λj is household j’s Pareto weight,
βj is household j’s subjective discount factor, π (st) is the probability that state
st occurs, and c
j(st) and q
j(st) are, household j’s consumption and endowment in
state st, respectively. Finally, b
j
t is a household specific parameter that captures
preference heterogeneity. The first-order conditions for this problem are
βjλjuc(c
j
t(st), b
j
t ) = µ(st) ∀ st. (2.2)
Notice that µ (st), the Lagrange multiplier normalized by the probability of the
state of the world st occurring, does not depend on j and therefore each individual’s
optimal consumption path is independent of her idiosyncratic endowment compo-
nent. Consequently, if markets are complete and there is full consumption insur-
ance, the discounted growth of marginal utility must be perfectly cross-sectionally
correlated
βj
uc(c
j
t+1, b
j
t+1)
uc(c
j
t , b
j
t )
=
µt+1
µt
. (2.3)
Assuming that households have power utility functions with risk aversion coeffi-
cient (ρ) common across individuals, modeling preferences heterogeneity through
multiplicative shocks, u(cjt , b
j
t ) = b
j
t
(cjt )
1−ρ
1−ρ
, and replacing into (2.2) we obtain the
following relationship
log(βj) + log(bjt ) + log(λ
j)− ρ log(cjt ) = log(µt). (2.4)
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Aggregating over the N households, yields
∑
j
1
N
log(µt) =
∑
j
ρ
log(cjt)
N
+
∑
j
log(βj)
N
+
∑
j
log(bjt)
N
+
∑
j
log(λj)
N
. (2.5)
Finally, substituting (2.5) into (2.4) we obtain
log(cjt ) = log c
A
t + φ
j + ωjt , (2.6)
where log cAt ≡
∑
j
log(cjt )
N
is the logarithm of aggregate consumption and where
φj =
1
ρ
[
log(βj)− 1
N
∑
j
log(βj)
]
+
1
ρ
[
log(λj)−
1
N
∑
j
log(λj)
]
,
ω
j
t =
1
ρ
[
log(bjt )−
1
N
∑
j
log(bjt )
]
.
Taking the first difference of equation (2.6), we obtain the following factor structure
representation for the growth rate of individual consumption
∆ log cjt = ∆ log c
A
t +∆ω
j
t , (2.7)
where ∆ log cjt and ∆ log c
A
t are the growth rates of individual j’s consumption
and aggregate consumption, respectively. Notice that any household fixed effects,
captured by φj , are removed when the model is taken in first differences.
Tests of perfect risk-sharing are based on the proposition that, given full consump-
tion insurance, individual consumption growth should be perfectly cross-sectionally
correlated. Hence, individual consumption growth should respond to aggregate risk
but not to idiosyncratic shocks captured, for example, by variations in household
income or employment status. Therefore, equation (2.7) suggests estimation of the
following regression equation
∆ log cjt −∆ log cAt = α′1∆ log cAt + α′2xjt + ξjt , (2.8)
where ∆ log cjt − ∆ log cAt is household j’s non-durable consumption growth net of
aggregate consumption growth and xjt is a q×1 vector of household specific variables
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meant to capture idiosyncratic endowment shocks. Finally, ξjt is defined as δ
′v
j
t +ǫ
j
t ,
where the first term captures observable changes in preferences and the second
term, ǫjt , captures unobservable changes in preferences as well as measurement
error. Consequently, unobservable determinants of individual consumption growth
will be captured in the regression by the error term ǫjt .
The variables included in xjt are meant to capture exogenous variations in household
endowments, which are not expected to affect the growth rate of consumption if
full insurance is implemented. Hence, to test full consumption insurance, the right-
hand side variables included in xjt should be independent of changes in individual
preferences, captured by the error term. Equation (2.8) yields a relatively straight
forward test of full consumption insurance, which has been explored before in work
by Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994). Thus, equation (2.8) can be recast in the
following form
y
j
t = α
′z
j
t + δ
′v
j
t + ǫ
j
t , (2.9)
where yjt ≡ ∆ log cjt −∆ log cAt and
zjt ≡
[
∆ log cAt
x
j
t
]
, α ≡
[
α1
α2
]
.
Finally, vjt is a p× 1 vector of household demographic variables, meant to control
for observable shifts in preferences caused, for example, by changes in household
size or in the number of children in the household.
Provided that the exogeneity assumptions are satisfied, full risk-sharing requires
the simple testable restriction α ≡
[
α1
α2
]
= 0.
3 Methodology: Band Spectrum Regression
Let the data set contain T observations on each household. The complex finite
Fourier transform is based on the T × T matrix W , in which each element (k, s) is
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given by
wk,s =
1√
T
ei s θk s = 0, 1, ..., T − 1, (3.1)
where θk =
2πk
T
, k = 0, 1, ..., T − 1 and i = √−1. Pre-multiplying the vector
of observations in the regression equation (2.9) by W , produces a finite fourier
transform of the time domain vectors, which yields the model
y˜
j
t = α
′z˜
j
t + δ
′v˜
j
t + ǫ˜
j
t , (3.2)
where y˜jt =Wy
j
t , z˜
j
t =Wz
j
t , v˜
j
t =Wv
j
t and ǫ˜
j
t = Wǫ
j
t .
Model (3.2) is a standard linear regression model made of T independent obser-
vations on y˜ conditioned on x˜, each of which corresponds to a different frequency.
The elements are amplitudes and phases of sine waves of different frequencies which
reflect the importance of each frequency component in the original time series. If
the disturbance vector in (2.9) are spherical and zero mean, that is E [ǫ] = 0 and
E [ǫǫ′] = σ2IT , then the transformed disturbance vector, ǫ˜, will have identical prop-
erties. This follows because the matrix W is unitary, that is, WW ′ = I, where W ′
is the transpose of the complex conjugate of W . Given the standard exogeneity as-
sumptions and assuming spherical disturbances, application of OLS to (3.2) yields
the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) of α. Thus, band spectrum regression
possesses standard small sample properties. This estimator is, of course, identical
to the OLS estimator in (2.9), a result which follows directly from the property
that W is a unitary matrix.
However, when the relationship implied by (3.2) is only assumed to hold for cer-
tain frequencies, band spectrum regression allows to test a restricted version of the
model in which some frequencies are ignored. This may be carried out by omitting
the observations in (3.2) corresponding to the remaining frequencies. Since the
variables in (3.2) are complex, Engle suggests performance of an inverse Fourier
transform in order to convert the variables into real terms again, thereby making
the use of standard regression routines feasible. This is done by first defining an
T × T matrix A which has zeros everywhere except in the positions on the lead-
ing diagonal corresponding to the included frequencies an next taking the inverse
9
fourier transformed of the fourier transform times A.2 Applying this method to
the regression equation in (2.9) yields
y
j∗
t = α
′z
j∗
t + δ
′v
j∗
t + ǫ
j∗
t , (3.3)
where yj∗t =W
′Ay˜
j
t , z
j∗
t =W
′Az˜
j
t , v
j∗
t =W
′Av˜
j
t and ǫ
j∗
t =W
′Aǫ˜
j
t .
The model given by (3.3) should be treated as a standard linear regression model,
except that if A is not full rank or, equivalently, if some frequencies are excluded, the
model’s degrees of freedom are only T ′−(1+q+p) instead of T−(1+q+p), where T ′
is the number of included frequencies. Thus, an unbiased estimator of σ2 is given by
σˆ2 =
∑
t ǫˆ
j∗
t ǫˆ
j∗
t
T ′−(1+q+p)
and the sampling statistics must be adjusted accordingly. Let the
transformed observation on each household be collected on the T×1 column vectors
yj∗ =
(
y
j∗
1 , ..., y
j∗
T
)′
, zj∗ =
(
z
j∗ ′
1 , ..., z
j∗ ′
T
)′
, vj∗ =
(
v
j∗ ′
1 , ..., v
j∗ ′
T
)′
, ǫj∗ =
(
ǫ
j∗
1 , ..., ǫ
j∗
T
)′
,
with j = 1, ..., N the household unit. The econometric methodology applied in
this paper relies on pooling the individual observations, transformed to exclude the
frequencies which are not of interest. Thus, defining
Y ∗ =
 y
1∗
...
yN∗
 , Z∗ =
 z
1∗
...
zN∗
 , V ∗ =
 v
1∗
...
vN∗
 , E∗ =
 ǫ
1∗
...
ǫN∗
 ,
I will perform a pooled panel regression by estimating the linear regression model
given by
Y ∗ = Z∗α+ V ∗δ + E∗. (3.4)
Accordingly, the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance corresponds to the
linear restriction α = 0. If the error term, capturing measurement error and changes
in preferences shifts, is homoskedastic and uncorrelated across time and across
households, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates and standard t-tests can be
performed. However, the model’s degrees of freedom are given by NT ′− (1+ q+p)
instead of the usual NT−(1+q+p), where T ′ is the number of included frequencies
2The estimator will only be real if both sines and cosines are included at each frequency. That
is, if frequency component k is included, than T − k must be included as well (Engle [1974]).
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and an unbiased estimator of σ2 is given by
σˆ2 =
∑T
t=1
∑N
j=1 ǫˆ
j∗
t ǫˆ
j∗
t
NT ′ − (1 + q + p) . (3.5)
4 Data and Empirical Implementation Issues
4.1 The Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
This paper uses household level data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). The PSID is a longitudinal study of nearly 8000 US households, following
the same families and individuals since 1968. The original PSID sample consisted of
two subsamples, a representative cross-section of 3000 U.S. families and a subsample
of 2000 low-income families sampled from the Survey of Economic Opportunity
(SEO). I drop the SEO subsample in order to work with a representative sample of
the U.S. population. Thereafter, both the original households and their split offs
have been interviewed each year. The survey includes a variety of socioeconomic
variables, including age, education, family structure and earnings. Let t be the
calendar year (1973 + t). I have used information on each household j ∈ (1, 2...N)
income and consumption between 1974 and 1986, corresponding to the calendar
years t = 1, 2...13, to build a balanced panel of observations.
The sample selection procedure, fully detailed in the Appendix, yields N = 966
households. Descriptive statistics about demographic characteristics of the house-
holds included in the panel are shown in table 1. The most comprehensive measure
of consumption which is available from the PSID and the one used in this paper is
total expenditure in food which is defined as food expenditure at home, plus food
stamps, plus meals away from home. The measure of aggregate consumption used
is the average of individual total food expenditure, taken over the N households.
An important aspect of the PSID data is that the earnings questions are retro-
spective. The interviews are conducted around March and many questions and in
particular those about family income refer to the previous calendar year. Thus, I
date the observations according to the year corresponding to the earnings, instead
of the year of the interview.
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Table 1: Household demographic characteristics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
1974 age of head 32.09 8.59 20 52
1974 age of wife 30.36 8.81 16 72
Household size 3.45 1.43 1 10
Children under 18 1.36 1.26 0 8
Percentage of individual-year pairs
Household head is male 93.69 %
Married households 85.56 %
Household owns house 76.56 %
Head finished high school 56.58 %
Head finished college 26.96 %
Note: The number of households included in the sample is 966. Sample period is 1974-1987.
However, the timing of the survey questions on food expenditure is much less clear
(see Hall and Mishkin [1982]; Blundell et al. [2002]). Households are asked to
report how much they spend on average in a given week and the answer to this
question is used to make inference about household yearly expenditure on food.
Since interviews are usually conducted from March onwards, it has been argued
that people report their food expenditure for an average week around that period,
rather than for the previous calendar year as for income.3 Consequently, and
following Altug and Miller (1990), I have defined food expenditure for year t as
25% of food expenditure reported in survey year t plus 75% of food expenditure
reported in survey year t+ 1.
The strongest evidence in favor of this procedure comes from Hall and Mishkin
(1982) who assume that new information about income, that the family uses to
decide on consumption dated in year t, includes a fraction Φ of new information on
3According to Hayashi et al. (1996) most interviews are conducted in March, April, or May.
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income that is not recorded by the survey until the following year. These authors
estimate Φ, the fraction of advanced information, to be equal to 0.25.
Crucially, the use of band spectrum regression reduces the eventual bias resulting
from possibly over-estimating the amount of information available to households
when they make their consumption decisions. This is because, by removing high
frequency noise and focusing on long lasting shocks (periodicities greater than three
years), I make sure that the consumption and income fluctuations captured are
“contemporaneous”. This is another important advantage of the method proposed
in this paper.
4.2 Measuring Endowment Shocks
The variables used to measure changes in household endowments were, Total House-
hold Income Net of Transfers, Average Hourly Earnings of the Head, Head’s Annual
Hours of Unemployment plus the Head’s Annual Hours of Work Lost to Strikes and
a dummy variable which takes value one when the household was forced to move
in response to outside events (e.g.: evictions; health reasons; divorce). All dollar
valued variables where deflated using the food price component of the CPI. Sum-
mary statistics on all these variables as well as on the different components of food
expenditure (from now on dubbed consumption) are shown in table 2. The reason
why I have chosen to work with the household income net of transfers is because
the transfer component of income includes some of the payments that implement a
consumption-insured allocation, such as worker’s compensation, child support and
help from relatives and are therefore state contingent payments instead of strictly
exogenous idiosyncratic endowment shocks.
However, as attractive as it may seem as a proxy for household endowment, the
household income net of transfers is unlikely to satisfy the orthogonality conditions
required for obtaining consistent estimates of the regression coefficients of interest.
This is because unobservable changes in household preferences, which are part of
the error term, such as an increase in the taste for leisure, simultaneously change
the household income and the consumption decisions, also under the null hypothesis
of full insurance.
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Table 2: Household summary statistics
Variable 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Endowments
Family income 27617 28953 30900 31276 31877 33483 35294 36343 37397 39493 42860 44311 44973
net of transfers (17791) (18679) (19175) (18196) (17891) (21468) (32236) (26329) (26806) (29124) (38505) (36076) (37529)
Head avg 9.83 10.38 10.73 10.92 10.94 11.44 11.39 12.16 12.53 12.94 13.58 13.78 13.88
hourly earnings (5.86) (7.13) (6.50) (7.23) (8.00) (8.67) (6.24) (8.13) (8.51) (8.66) (9.51) (9.66) (10.46)
Hours lost to strike 60 31 59 57 36 28 42 59 72 63 45 49 43
or unemployment (191) (251) (215) (211) (158) (142) (172) (211) (254) (233) (177) (197) (176)
% Involuntary move 2.9% 1.7% 2.6% 1.8% 2.2% 1.8% 2.0% 1.9% 1.2% 1.3% 1.2% 1.9% 1.7%
Consumption
Expenditure Meals 3551 3705 3676 3707 3741 3715 3743 3737 3750 3751 3807 3745 3651
at home (1715) (1866) (1829) (1794) (1868) (1832) (1828) (1797) (1846) (1854) (1873) (1871) (1841)
Expenditure Meals 633 774 832 858 865 857 851 899 912 1027 1062 1010 1068
away from home (743) (910) (962) (927) (970) (975) (927) (978) (925) (1039) (1106) (998) (1048)
Value of 28 32 23 18 10 13 23 21 29 21 13 14 12
food stamps (224) (230) (181) (151) (78) (120) (172) (166) (226) (174) (121) (155) (133)
Note: Summary statistics for household consumption and endowment variables. In parenthesis are standard deviations. Dollar valued
variables are in 1983 dollars.
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In contrast to the total family income net of transfers, the other three variables
can reasonably be expected to be independent from shifts in individual preferences
and, consequently, orthogonal to the error term.4
Therefore, the strategy adopted in the empirical implementation of the full insur-
ance test is a two-step instrumental variables procedure. I first estimate a regression
model for household log income that includes as explanatory variables, apart from
demographic control variables, the three instrumental variables mentioned above
as well as two interaction terms, one between the head wage rate and the number
of days lost to strike and unemployment, and another one between the wage rate
and the involuntary move dummy variable. In the second step I use the changes in
the predicted level of log income to proxy for idiosyncratic endowment shocks and
estimate model (2.9) in order to implement the full consumption insurance test.
Hence, the two equations estimated are
log INCjt = λ
′ INST
j
t + e
j
t ,
∆ log cjt −∆ log cAt = α′1∆ log cAt + α′2∆ ̂log INCjt + δ′v˜jt + ǫjt .
Unfortunately, full information IV methods are not feasible because of the band
spectrum regression procedure. Therefore, the two-step procedure fails to account
for the fact that the generated regressors have been estimated, when the second-
step coefficients and the standard errors are calculated. However, given the nature
of the null hypothesis being tested (full insurance requires α = 0), our test statistics
are asymptotically consistent (Pagan [1984], Theorem 3).
The strategy just described, resembles the procedure suggested by Altonji and Siow
(1987) who identify endowment shocks through other reported measures of income
such as hours of involuntary inactivity and wage rates, and also follow a two-step
procedure. In particular, an important maintained assumption, which is also made
by Altonji and Siow (1987), is that the income determinants used are exogenous
with respect to unobservable changes in the marginal utility of consumption. A
similar assumption is made in Dynarski and Gruber (1997). The results of the first
4I will label the exogenous variables: Involuntary Inactivity which equals Head’s Annual Hours
of Unemployment plus the Head’s Annual Hours of Work Lost to Strikes; Involuntary Move
which equals one when the household was forced to move in response to outside events and zero
elsewhere; and the Wage Rate which equals the Log of Average Head’s Hourly Earnings.
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Table 3: First stage regression
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Log of Head Hourly Earnings (Wage Rate) 0.6653∗∗ (0.0069)
Involuntary Inactivity (Days Lost) -0.0004∗∗ (0.0000)
Involuntary Move -0.0572 (0.0922)
Wage Rate × Days Lost -0.0001∗∗ (0.0000)
Wage Rate × Involuntary Move -0.0201 (0.0417)
Household Size 0.0360∗∗ (0.0024)
Female Head -0.4537∗∗ (0.0142)
Age of Head 0.0103∗∗ (0.0003)
High School Education 0.1237∗∗ (0.0095)
College Education 0.2230∗∗ (0.0112)
Head is Black -0.0585∗∗ (0.0098)
Head is Hispanic 0.0055 (0.0224)
Sample Size 12558
Adjusted R2 0.66
F-stat 2003.21
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of Total Household Income Net of Transfers.
The specification includes an intercept.
stage regression are shown in table 3.
4.3 Measurement Error
When studying the relationship between changes in consumption and changes in
income, the presence of measurement error in income might bias the estimates
in various ways. One might expect the presence of measurement error to result
in a downward bias in the estimated response of consumption to income. On
the other hand Altonji and Siow (1987) argue that previous work by Hall and
Mishckin (1982) might have overestimated the impact of transitory income shocks
on consumption because the presence of measurement error can make income to
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appear more transitory than it actually is.5 An important application of band
spectrum regression, first suggested in Engle (1974), is the estimation of linear
regression models where the right-hand side variables are possibly measured with
error.6
Thus, suppose that in the model described in (3.4)
Y = Zα+ V δ + E,
some variables in X are measured with error. To be precise, suppose that X is a
single variable (say exogenous changes in income) which can not be observed but
instead υ = X + u is observed. If the signal to noise ratio of υ is higher at some
frequencies, then by just including these frequencies and removing the remaining
ones, it is possible to increase the precision of the estimates.
When estimating model (3.4) using the generated regressors from the first stage,
it is natural to assume that the explanatory variable used in the second stage re-
gression to measure idiosyncratic changes in household endowments has a stronger
signal to noise ratio at business cycle frequencies because of the nature of the id-
iosyncratic explanatory variables used in the first stage regression, in particular
involuntary inactivity periods and the real wage rate, which are business cycle
variables at the aggregate level. Hence, by removing high frequency components
and very low frequency components I am likely to increase the precision of my
estimates.
Moreover, by removing high frequency components I also align the observation
on consumption and on income, as previously discussed. In general, removing
frequency bands where the right-hand side variables have a low signal to noise is
analogous to the use of moving average filters to eliminate high frequency noise
components from measured income in tests of the PIH.
5See Altonji and Siow (1987), page 318.
6For a specific application example see Engle and Foley (1975).
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5 Results
In this section I will present results for two groups of models: the baseline models,
for which the measure of household endowments shocks used is the change in the
log household total income net of transfers; and the two-step models, for which the
proxy for endowment shocks is the changes in the predicted log household income.
Apart from the change of the log aggregate consumption and the endowment shock
proxy, the other right-hand side variables are the change in family size, the change
in the number of underage children and the change in the log family food standards.
These three variables are meant to capture observable changes in preferences.
All models are estimated using both standard time domain OLS and applying the
band spectrum regression technique. Moreover, for the models estimated using
standard OLS, three specifications are considered: one in which one year first
differences are taken; next, five year first differences; and finally, ten year first
differences. This was done in an effort to capture features of the data present at
different frequencies and in particular to obtain power against the self-insurance
alternative hypothesis. As for the models estimated using band spectrum regression
methods, I consider three different frequency bands. Since the models are all taken
in differences, the panel time series dimension is T − 1 = 12.
Consequently, the identifiable frequencies are
θk =
2πk
T − 1 : θk ≤ π, k = 1, 2, ..., 11.
This yields six frequencies corresponding to the periodicities: 2 years; 22
5
years; 3
years; 4 years; 6 years; and 12 years. I therefore defined three different bands, the
very short run (2 years, 22
5
years), the business cycle (3 years, 6 years) and the
long run (12 years, ∞).
Results are reported in table 4 for the baseline model estimated using standard
OLS. The three different columns give results for the three different first differ-
ence horizons considered. The t-statistics of the estimated coefficients are shown
bellow the estimates, in parenthesis. And in the last two rows, the F -statistic as
well as the p-value is shown for the null hypothesis of full consumption insurance,
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Table 4: Baseline regression (Time Domain)
One Year Five Years Ten Years
Variable Time Differences Time Differences Time Differences
∆ log Aggregate -0.0897 -0.2255 -0.3335∗
Consumption → α1 (-0.75) (-1.25) (-2.10)
∆ log Household 0.0665∗∗ 0.1613∗∗ 0.1808∗∗
Income → α2 (9.62) (18.99) (14.09)
∆ Family Size -0.0044 0.0163† -0.0691∗∗
(-0.49) (1.83) (-4.20)
∆ Number 0.0251∗∗ 0 .0495∗∗ 0.0876∗∗
Children under 18 (3.75) (7.54) (8.37)
∆ log Family 0.0483∗ 0.2174∗∗ 0.5097∗∗
Needs (1.96) (9.76) (12.45)
H0: α1 − α2 = 0; α2 = 0
F-stat 46.35 180.52 100.08
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of individual consumption minus the growth rate of
aggregate consumption (∆ log c −∆log cA). In parenthesis are t-values. The specification includes
an intercept.
corresponding to α ≡
[
α1
α2
]
= 0.
Clearly the null hypothesis of full insurance is rejected, no matter the length of the
first difference horizon chosen. Thus, at first glance, households appear unable to
smooth consumption when exposed to idiosyncratic endowment shocks. Moreover,
the idiosyncratic income coefficient estimate, αˆ2, is always significantly different
from zero, and this is clearly causing the rejection of the full insurance hypothesis.
However, the size of this coefficient increases with the horizon considered, suggest-
ing that the growth rate of consumption reacts more strongly to shocks that are
more long lasting. The permanent income hypothesis with no risk sharing predicts
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that a purely transitory 1 percent income shock increases consumption by 1 percent
times the interest rate.7 This is broadly consistent with the point estimate of α2
for the one year horizon model. Insurance against more long lasting shocks seems
to be much less. Mace (1991) performs the same test using data from the CEX
and reports somewhat similar findings to the ones reported in the first column of
table 4.8
Also noteworthy, the size of the aggregate consumption growth coefficient estimate,
αˆ1, is not significantly different from zero, except at very long horizons (at which
the 5% level test leads to a rejection). If the maintained assumption of a common
coefficient of relative risk aversion, the coefficient ρ, was false, this would lead to an
estimate of α1 different from zero. Thus, this constitutes a finding which provides
evidence consistent with the maintained assumption of a common coefficient of
relative risk aversion. Another interesting finding is that the demographic control
variables included affect the growth rate of consumption significantly only for the
model corresponding to the ten years horizon. This suggests that such demographic
changes, which might translate into long lasting changes in living standards, affect
the low frequency component of consumption.
However, as was argued before, changes in household income are not an appropriate
right-hand side variable because they will likely be correlated with the error term.
Therefore, I now turn to the results in table 5 where the standard OLS estimates
of the two-step model are presented.
Again the full consumption insurance hypothesis is clearly rejected at all horizons
and the joint test p-values are essentially zero, although the F statistics are smaller
than before. However, the coefficient estimate αˆ2 is smaller at the one year horizon
than the one year baseline estimate and has a smaller t-stat as well, which suggests
that the endogeneity of income biases upwards the estimated impact of endowment
shocks, as expected if leisure and consumption are substitutes. At longer horizons,
however, the reverse is true.9 Moreover, the size of the point estimate increases
7See Cochrane (1991), page 973.
8Mace (1991), table 3.
9This might be interpreted as evidence in favor of different elasticities of substitution in the
short run and the long run.
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Table 5: Two steps model (Time Domain)
One Year Five Years Ten Years
Variable Time Differences Time Differences Time Differences
∆ log Aggregate -0.0740 -0.1848 -0.2874†
Consumption → α1 (-0.62) (-1.02) (-1.79)
∆ Predicted log 0.0546∗∗ 0.1624∗∗ 0.1982∗∗
Household Income → α2 (6.37) (14.31) (11.23)
∆ Family Size -0.0023 0.0270∗∗ -0.0581∗∗
(-0.25) (2.99) (-3.51)
∆ Number 0.0216∗∗ 0.0273∗∗ 0.0575∗∗
Children under 18 (3.23) (4.20) (5.55)
∆ log Family 0.0247∗ 0.2520∗∗ 0.5696∗∗
Needs (2.16) (11.24) (13.81)
H0: α1 − α2 = 0; α2 = 0
F-stat 20.41 102.55 63.83
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of individual consumption minus the growth rate of
aggregate consumption (∆ log c −∆log cA). In parenthesis are t-values. The specification includes
an intercept.
with the horizon considered. The conclusions regarding αˆ1 are essentially the same
as in the previous specification. On balance, the standard OLS estimates clearly
lead to a rejection of the complete markets assumption. Thus, I now turn to the
results obtained using the proposed pooled band spectrum regression method.
Table 6 shows estimates for the baseline specification. Each column corresponds to
one of the three different frequency bands, the very short run (2 years, 22
5
years),
the business cycle (3 years, 6 years) and the long run (12 years, ∞). The test
statistics are the standard ones, however, as described before, an adjustment has
to be made for the degrees of freedom. Thus, the estimator for the standard de-
viation of the error component is computed using (3.5). Turning first to the very
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Table 6: The Baseline model (Band Spectrum Regression)
Very Short Run Business Cycle Long Run
Variable 2 years - 2 2
5
years 3 years - 6 years 12 years - ∞
∆ log Aggregate 0.0148 -0.1175 -0.1732
Consumption → α1 (0.05) (-0.81) (-0.20)
∆ log Household 0.0007 0.0844∗∗ 0.1620∗∗
Income → α2 (0.06) (8.12) (11.63)
∆ Family Size -0.0107 -0.0118 0.0168
(-0.64) (-0.85) (1.13)
∆ Number -0.0015 0.0151 0.0535∗∗
Children under 18 (-0.12) (1.48) (4.96)
∆ log Family -0.0915∗ 0.0824∗ 0.2132∗∗
Needs (-1.98) (2.14) (5.66)
H0: α1 − α2 = 0; α2 = 0
F-stat 0.00 33.08 67.69
p-value 0.997 0.000 0.000
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of individual consumption minus the growth rate of
aggregate consumption (∆ log c −∆log cA). In parenthesis are t-values. The specification includes
an intercept but no degrees of freedom adjustment was made.
short run, the full insurance hypothesis clearly cannot be rejected. Moreover, in
the very short run, the growth rate of consumption is not responsive to idiosyn-
cratic endowment changes at any significance level. As argued before, this can be
the result of measurement error leading to a downward bias in the α2 estimate;
however it also highlights the fact that at high frequencies, the full insurance test
has no power against the null hypothesis of self insurance. On the other hand these
findings suggest that liquidity constraints do not seem to prevent households from
smoothing high frequency consumption fluctuations.
Turning to the business cycle frequencies, which I identify as corresponding to the
periodicities between three years and six years, full insurance is soundly rejected.
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The contrast with the very short run, suggests that the findings for the higher fre-
quencies may be either an artifact of measurement error, or alternatively the result
of self-insurance, which allows households to smooth consumption fluctuations in
the very short run. The coefficient on the growth rate of income, α2, which is again
significantly different from zero and thus is causing the rejection of the joint hy-
pothesis of full insurance, is higher than the estimates obtained through standard
OLS at the one year horizon. Again, this is consistent with the PIH benchmark.
Using the certainty equivalence model and thus Hall’s (1978) martingale hypoth-
esis as a benchmark, purely transitory (one year) 1 percent income shocks should
increases consumption by 1 percent times the interest rate and equivalently, the
response of consumption to a shock which is more persistence, lasting for example
3 years, should be greater and equal to the annuity value of the shock.
As for the changes in demographic characteristics, except for changes in family
needs, the other variables are not important in explaining changes in the growth
rate of consumption. This is probably explained by the small variance of demo-
graphic variables at business cycle frequencies. Thus, to the extent that unobserv-
able preference shifts are also driven by demographic factors, it is reasonable to
expect that the endogeneity problems may be a smaller source of asymptotic bias
at business cycle frequencies. Finally, in the very long run, the full insurance hy-
pothesis is again rejected. Moreover, the demographic variables are significant at
explaining changes in the growth rate of consumption. Again, the findings are con-
sistent with the PIH benchmark, but no insurance above what would be predicted
by the PIH seems to be achieved, in particular at business cycle frequencies.
I finally turn my attention to the two-step model, estimated using the band spec-
trum method. The findings are reported in table 7. The results of the full con-
sumption insurance test are very similar to the ones obtained using the baseline
model in stead of the two-step procedure.
The full insurance hypothesis is rejected at business cycle frequencies and at lower
frequencies, but it cannot be rejected in the very short run. Therefore, results
again suggest that most consumption insurance is due to self-insurance. Moreover,
the findings are broadly consistent with the PIH theory, and in particular liquid-
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Table 7: Two steps model (Band Spectrum Regression)
Very Short Run Business Cycle Long Run
Variable 2 years - 2 2
5
years 3 years - 6 years 12 years - ∞
∆ log Aggregate 0.0154 -0.0931 0.0124
Consumption → α1 (0.05) (-0.64) (0.01)
∆ Predicted log 0.0166 0.0633∗∗ 0.1753∗∗
Household Income → α2 (1.19) (4.84) (8.95)
∆ Family Size -0.0114 -0.0079 0.0284†
(-0.68) (-0.57) (1.90)
∆ Number -0.0011 0.0092 0.0286∗∗
Children under 18 (-0.09) (7.54) (2.68)
∆ log Family -0.0926∗ 0.0913∗ 0.2488∗∗
Needs (-2.01) (2.36) (6.57)
H0: α1 − α2 = 0; α2 = 0
F-stat 0.71 11.83 40.08
p-value 0.494 0.000 0.000
Significance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: The dependent variable is the growth rate of individual consumption minus the growth rate of
aggregate consumption (∆ log c −∆log cA). In parenthesis are t-values. The specification includes
an intercept but no degrees of freedom adjustment was made.
ity constraints apparently do not prevent households from achieving the level of
consumption smoothing predicted by the PIH.
Comparing the estimates of α2 obtained using the two steps instrumental variable
procedure with the ones presented previously, the evidence again suggests that
the endogeneity of income may lead to an upward bias in the estimation, at high
frequencies and at business cycle frequencies, suggesting substitutability between
consumption and leisure, however the reverse is true for the very long run. This
result is consistent with the evidence provided by the standard OLS estimates.
As for the estimates of α1, which are never significantly different from zero, the
results are again consistent with the maintained assumption of a common coeffi-
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cient of relative risk aversion, at all the frequency bands. Finally, as before, the
changes in demographic factors only appear to significantly affect the growth rate of
consumption in the long run, consistent with the interpretation that demographic
changes translate into long lasting changes in living standards, which affect the low
frequency component of consumption.
6 Conclusion
This paper attempts to test full consumption insurance and at the same time it
distinguishes between consumption smoothing trough self-insurance and consump-
tion insurance through risk-sharing. Thus, the central contribution of this paper is
to offer a framework which simultaneously allows testing consumption smoothing
across time and across states of nature.
The method employed, band spectrum regression, allows identifying features of
measured consumption growth over particular frequencies such as business cycles,
seasonal frequencies or long horizons, without requiring parametric assumptions
to distinguish between transitory and permanent shocks. Another advantage of
the econometric approach is that spectrum regression allows estimating errors-in-
variables models with more precision when it is suspected that the signal-to-noise
ratio of some explanatory variables might be greater a some particular frequencies.
Therefore, provided that frequencies at which the signal-to-noise ratio is weaker
are removed, the full consumption insurance test proposed will be free of bias from
measurement error. This approach resembles the use of moving average filters used
to eliminate high frequency noise components from measured income in tests of the
PIH. However, it is a non-parametric approach and therefore more robust to the
presence of measurement error.
To summarize the results of the paper, the full consumption insurance hypothesis is
soundly rejected at business cycle frequencies and at lower frequencies, but it cannot
be rejected in the short run. Therefore, the findings are broadly consistent with the
PIH theory. In particular liquidity constraints do not appear to prevent households
from achieving the level of high frequency consumption smoothing predicted by the
PIH. However, no evidence is found in favor of insurance implementation beyond
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self-insurance. The rejection of the full insurance hypothesis at business cycle
frequencies raises questions about the appropriateness of business cycle models
which are built on the assumption of complete markets and hence full risk-sharing.
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A Appendix
A.1 Variables Definition
Consumption: is total food consumption (food at home + food stamps + meals
away from home) in 1983 dollars deflated using the food price component of the
CPI.
Family Income Net of Transfers: Taxable Income of Head and Wife + Total Trans-
fers of Head and Wife + Taxable Income of Others + Transfer Income of Others
− Total transfer income of Head and Wife, in 1983 dollars deflated using the food
price component of the CPI.
Wage Rate: log (Labor Income of Head in 1983 dollars deflated using the food
price component of the CPI/Hours of Work For Money of Head)
Involuntary Inactivity: Head’s annual hours of unemployment + Head’s annual
hours on strike
Involuntary Move: Dummy equaled one if head moved because of response to
outside events (involuntary reasons): (household unit) coming down; being evicted;
armed services; health reasons; divorce; retiring because of health; etc...
Family Size: Actual number of persons in Family Unit.
Number of Underage Children: Actual number of children aged 0-17.
Food Needs: This variable is generated by multiplying the weekly food needs by 52
and then making the following adjustments for economies of scale: add 20 percent
for one-person families, 10 percent for two-person families, 5 percent for three-
person families and subtract 5 percent for five-person families and 10 percent for
families with six or more persons.
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A.2 Sample Selection Procedure
The sample of households used in this paper were drawn from the 1974-1988 family
files. The sample selection procedure leading to the balanced panel used throughout
the paper was the following:
1. households that were part of the original SEO subsample were excluded:
28080 observations deleted.
2. observations for which the total family income was negative or missing were
excluded: 88605 observations deleted.
3. observations for which the head average hourly earnings were negative or
missing were excluded: 14705 observations deleted.
4. observations for which the real total family income increased more than 300%
or decreased more than 75% were excluded: 880 observations deleted.
5. observations for which the real total family food expenditure increased by
more than 300% or decreased by more than 75% were excluded: 1183 obser-
vations deleted.
6. households in which there occurred a change in the head were excluded: 29544
observations deleted.
7. households whose head is a farmer were excluded: 379 observations deleted.
8. households whose head age was misreported were excluded: 271 observations
deleted.
9. households whose head was older than 65 or younger than 20 were excluded:
1891 observations deleted.
10. households whose head does not know how to read or write or for which the
education is misreported were excluded: 391 observations deleted.
This selection procedure allowed to construct a balanced panel of 966 households
over 13 years, corresponding to 12558 observations.
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